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THE ALTERNATIVE AMENDMENT PROCESS: 
SOME OBSERVATIONS 
Paul G. Kauper* 
THE alternative method of formal amendment of the Constitution raises unresolved questions of interpretation. As a contribution 
to the formulation of procedures for the implementation of this 
method Senator Ervin has introduced a bill dealing with the matter 
in considerable detail.1 In dealing with the subject I propose to dis-
cuss not only the convention procedure provided in article V, and in 
this connection point up some considerations respecting Senator 
Ervin's bill, but also some basic questions relating to the formal 
amendment process and the role assumed by the Supreme Court in 
the process of constitutional change. 
Senator Ervin is to be commended for submitting a proposal 
designed to clarify and regularize the procedures for constitutional 
amendment via the convention method upon application of the 
legislatures of two-thirds of the states. His proposal points up the 
problems and questions which must be faced in any recourse to this 
method and opens up for debate and discussion some very basic 
questions on which controversy may be expected. 
While it is not my purpose to examine Senator Ervin's bill in 
detail, attention will be called to some basic assumptions underlying 
it and to those features of the procedures embodied in the bill which 
raise fundamental questions respecting the formal processes of con-
stitutional amendment in a federal system. 
Senator Ervin's bill proceeds on certain assumptions: that the 
alternative method of proposing amendments to the Constitution by 
means of a constitutional convention is to be taken seriously, that 
Congress is under a duty to call a convention when the prerequisites 
are satisfied, that Congress has a broad supervisory and regulatory 
power in prescribing the procedures to govern this method of con-
stitutional amendment, and that it may exclude the courts from 
examining the validity of practices followed and determinations 
made in accordance with the terms of the bill. 
There can be no quarrel with the assumption that Congress and, 
• Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1929, Earlham 
College; J.D. 1932, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The bill was amended by Senator Ervin after 
its introduction. For the text of the bill as amended, see appx. I to Senator Ervin's 
article in this symposium, 66 MICH. L. REv. 875, 896 (1968). 
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indeed, the nation should take seriously the method of constitutional 
amendment to which this proposal is directed. Article V prescribes 
two methods for amendment. Only the first method, whereby Con-
gress proposes amendments and the states ratify, has been employed 
to date. Here the initiative lies with Congress, and two-thirds of both 
houses of Congress must concur before a proposal is submitted to the 
states. The alternative method, here under discussion, gives the initia-
tive to the states in making proposals at a constitutional convention 
and subjects the process to congressional supervision. This method 
gives to the states the greater voice in the amending process. The con-
vention called by Congress in response to the applications of two-
thirds of the states assumes the same role in initiating amendments 
as does Congress by two-thirds vote of both its houses under the 
method followed to date. 
It was no accident that the drafters included this alternative 
method. While the records of the 1787 Convention are .fragmentary 
in showing the history of article V, 2 it is interesting to note that the 
2. Examination of Farrand's THE RECORDS OF nIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
(M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Farrand], yields the following picture rela-
tive to the proposals respecting constitutional amendment procedures: 
Apparently the problem first came under consideration when the Committee on 
the Whole took up proposition 13, "that provision ought to be made for [hereafter] 
amending tl1e system now to be established, without requiring the assent of the Natl. 
Legislature." I Farrand at 121. On the later consideration of resolution 13, several 
members did not see any need at all for the resolution nor the propriety of making the 
consent of the National Legislature unnecessary. Mason urged the necessity of such 
a provision, arguing that amendments would be necessary and that it "would be im-
proper to require the consent of the Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their 
power, and refuse their consent on that very account. The opportunity for such an 
abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendment." I id. at 203. Ran-
dolph supported these arguments. Resolution 13 passed but consideration of the words 
"without requiring the consent of the Natl. Legislature" was postponed. I id. at 202-03. 
The proposal that Congress call a convention to revise or alter the Articles of Union, 
on application of two-thirds of the state legislatures, first appears in proceedings of 
the Committee of Detail. II id. at 148-49. This was formalized in Document IX of the 
Committee of Detail. II id. at 174. The text of the proposed constitution as reported by 
the Committee of Detail, Aug. 6, 1787, included the following article XIX: "On the 
application of the Legislatures of ~vo thirds of the States in the Union, for an amend-
ment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United Sates shall call a Convention 
for that purpose." II id. at 188. The Convention agreed to this article, although Morris 
had suggested that the Congress should be left at liberty to call a convention when-
ever it pleased. II id. at 468. 
The questions relating to the amendment procedure appear to have received the 
most extended discussion at the Convention on September 10, 1787. Article XIX was 
amended to authorize Congress to propose amendments to the several states. Gerry 
moved to reconsider the proposal that Congress be required to call a convention to 
propose amendments on application of two-thirds of the legislatures. He expressed 
the fear that thereby a majority could bind the Union to innovation that might sub-
vert the state constitutions altogether. Hamilton supported his proposal but for the 
reason that the state legislatures would not apply for alterations other than with a 
view to increasing their own power. Hamilton said that the National Legislature 
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early discussions and proposals centered on the question of excluding 
Congress from a significant role in the amendment process. As dis-
cussion of the problem continued, the desirability if not the necessity 
of giving the central government an important role in the amend-
ment process became apparent. What finally emerged from the con-
vention was what may be described as the compromise set forth in 
article V, whereby a power of initiative was to reside in both Con-
gress and the states pursuant to the two alternative methods, with the 
final authority of ratification under both methods in the states. It is 
evident from the discussion at the time that the alternative method 
recognizing state initiative was considered an important safety valve 
to guard against abuses of federal power which would not be cor-
rected if the power to initiate amendments was vested solely in 
Congress.3 Such an alternative makes sense in a system which in all 
other respects represents a deep commitment to the principle of 
federalism. 
Not much need be said about the duty of Congress to call a 
convention to propose amendments after two-thirds of the states 
have petitioned Congress to do so. The constitutional language is 
plain. The language "[t]he Congress ... shall call a convention" is 
imperative.4 Whether any legal procedure would be available to 
would be the most sensitive to the necessity of amendments and ought to be so em-
powered when two-thirds of each House agreed to call a convention. Madison agreed 
that article XIX should be reconsidered because of the vagueness of the term "call a 
Convention for the purpose." After further amendment proposals were made, the 
Convention adopted Madison's proposal, seconded by Hamilton, that the national 
legislature "whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the ap-
plication of two-thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amend-
ments to this Constitution .•.• " II id. at 559. This proposal was then incorporated in 
article V of the text of the proposed Constitution as referred to the Committee of 
Style. II id. at 602. 
In the debates that followed, Mason stated his objection to article V on the ground 
that both modes of amendment in the end depended on Congress, so that "no amend-
ments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government 
should become oppressive, as he verily believed would be the case." II id. at 629. The 
proposal was then made to amend article V so as to require a convention on applica-
tion of two-thirds of the states. Madison said that he "did not see why Congress would 
not be as much bound to propose amendments applied for by two-thirds of the States 
as to call a convention on the like application. He saw no objection however against 
providing for a Convention for the purpose of amendments, except only that difficul-
ties might arise as to the form, the quorum, etc.,'' matters which he thought ought 
to be possibly avoided in constitutional regulation. The amendment was adopted. II id. 
at 629-30. As so amended and subject to the further amendment that no state without 
its consent should be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate, article V was carried 
over into the final text of the Constitution. II id. at 662-63. 
3. See note 2 supra for the statements of Colonel Mason who apparently was the 
chief spokesman at the 1787 Convention in support of the view that the states should 
have a voice in the amendment process free from congressional control. 
4. The earlier proposal in the Convention as embodied in the text referred to the 
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compel it to perform. its duty is another question. Even conceding 
the reach of the judicial power as exercised these days, I find it 
difficult to believe that the Supreme Court would issue an order com-
pelling Congress to carry out a duty which can hardly be called a 
simple ministerial duty or would, in the alternative, take it upon 
itself to prescribe the procedures for a convention. I much prefer to 
·rely on the integrity of Congress in carrying out a constitutional duty. 
A great merit of Senator Ervin's proposal is that it recognizes the 
duty. This in itself would operate as a substantial moral compulsion. 
Senator Ervin's bill rests on the broad assumption that Congress 
has a large voice in supervising this method of constitutional amend-
ment. It prescribes the rules to be followed in determining when 
there are valid applications by two-thirds of the states to initiate the 
machinery for calling a convention, and the procedure to be followed 
in the calling of a convention, including the steps to be taken by 
Congress in the designation of the place and time of meeting of the 
convention, its duration, and the compensation to be paid the dele-
gates. It prescribes the number of delegates to be elected in each 
state and declares that each delegate will have one vote and that any 
proposal to be adopted by the convention must receive a majority 
of all the delegates. 
This assumption that Congress has a broad power to fashion the 
ground rules for the calling of the convention and to prescribe basic 
procedures to be followed is well founded. The national legislature 
is obviously the most appropriate body for exercising a supervisory 
authority, for ,the duty to call a convention necessarily embraces the 
authority to determine whether the conditions which create the duty 
Committee on Style was that Congress "on the application of two-thirds of the Legis-
latures of the several states, shall propose amendments to this Constitution . • • ." 
Apparently, this was thought to leave too much discretion to Congress, and the lan-
guage was substituted that Congress on the application of two-thirds of the states, 
shall call a Convention for proposing amendments in order to make clear that Congress 
had a duty to act in response to the applications from the states. See II Farrand at 
629-30; note 2 supra. 
Although Hamilton had originally opposed the proposal that the states have an 
independent power to initiate amendments and thought that the power to initiate 
amendments should reside in Congress (see note 2 supra), there was no doubt in his 
mind that Congress was under a duty to call a convention on application of two-thirds 
of the states as indicated by the following excerpt from The Federalist No. 85, at 450 
(Everyman's Library ed. 1911): 
By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on the application 
of the legislatures of two thirds of the States [which at present amount to nine], 
to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all 
intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legisla-
tures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof." 
The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention." 
Nothing in this particular is left to the- discretion of that body. 
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are satisfied. Similarly, the power to issue a call for a convention im-
plies the power to fix its time, place, and duration, and the com-
pensation of delegates. Moreover, some questions, such as the com-
position of the convention, the method of selecting the delegates, and 
whether each state shall vote as a unit as opposed to voting by 
individual delegates, are fundamental questions which cannot be 
resolved by the delegates themselves. A broad supervisory role of 
Congress inheres in the situation. 
This supervisory role as asserted in the Ervin bill means much 
more than a general housekeeping function of Congress. It involves 
the authority to pass upon some very basic substantive questions 
which assume constitutional significance. May Congress, for instance, 
limit the agenda of the convention by restricting amendment pro-
posals emanating from it to certain subjects? Does Congress have the 
authority to determine the basis on which votes will be taken, and 
if it has this authority is it limited by the Constitution to the choice 
of a particular basis? These questions become difficult when it is 
recognized that it does not follow from Congress' broad supervisory 
authority that its determination of basic questions is free from im-
plied constitutional limitations or that Congress is the final judge on 
the resolution of the constitutional issues. 
Senator Ervin's bill rests on the assumption that Congress not 
only has the power to make the definitive rules but also the ultimate 
authority to make determinations within the framework of the rules 
it has prescribed. Its provisions reflect a general purpose to limit the 
judiciary in its review of the amendment process. Thus, after stating 
the general proposition that no convention called pursuant to its 
provisions may propose any amendment or amendments of a general 
nature different from that stated in the concurrent resolution calling 
the convention, the bill declares that questions arising under this 
section shall be determined solely by the Congress of the United 
States, and its decisions shall be binding on all others, including state 
and federal courts.is The same rule is made applicable to the deter-
mination of questions concerning state ratification or rejection of 
amendments proposed to the Constitution,6 and to questions con-
cerning the state legislative procedure and the validity of the adop-
tion of a state resolution requesting Congress to call a convention.7 
Any extended exploration of the question whether the Constitu-
5. S. 2037, § IO(b) (amended bill). 
6. Id. § 15(c) (amended bill). 
7. Id. §§ 3(b), 13(a) (amended bill). 
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tion gives to Congress the ultimate authority, to the exclusion of the 
courts, to determine constitutional issues relating to the amendment 
process, is beyond the scope of this Article. Certainly Coleman v. 
Miller8 goes far in holding that questions going to the amendment 
process i~self are nonjusticiable in the sense that Congress has the 
final authority on these matters. But whether Congress can insulate 
the questions as thoroughly from judicial review as is proposed in the 
Ervin bill is not clear, although as a practical matter it may be sup-
posed that the courts will accord Congress a wide discretion both in 
interpreting the article V language and in administering the legisla-
tion designed to implement it. In any event the vital questions raised 
by the bill furnish a basis for discussion, both in their legal and policy 
aspects, regardless of whether Congress or the courts have the final 
voice in their resolution. 
Attention will now be directed to the features of the Ervin bill 
which raise basic issues. 
Article V is silent on how representation in the convention is to 
be determined. The resolution of this question opens up the central 
issue whether such a convention is to be a national convention of 
delegates elected by means of the state machinery or whether it is a 
convention representing the states. The Constitutional Convention 
of I 787 consisted of state delegations. If the same method were fol-
lowed today in implementing the convention procedure, each state 
would be permitted to determine the number of its delegates and to 
prescribe the method of appointing or electing them. This method 
of necessity would imply a unit rule of voting and a single vote for 
each state, matters to be discussed later. But in the absence of com-
pelling language in article V, Congress should be free to look upon 
such a convention as a convention of delegates representing not the 
states but the people of the United States. Proceeding on this assump-
tion Congress could authorize a natiomvide election to be conducted 
under state auspices whereby delegates would be elected from each 
state in proportion to the population and elected either statewide or 
on a district basis, following the same lines as those used for elections 
to the House of Representatives. 
Senator Ervin's proposal in its original form rested on the premise 
that the convention is a convention of the states speaking through 
their representatives. It called for delegates from each state equal 
to the number of its Representatives in Congress, to be elected or 
8. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
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appointed as provided by state law;9 a unit rule was prescribed, and 
each state had one vote in the convention proceedings.10 But under 
the amended bill, the number of delegates from a state is determined 
by the total of its Senators and Representatives in Congress; each 
delegate has a vote, and the convention's action in approving a pro-
posal is determined by a majority of the total number of delegates to 
the convention.11 
A serious defect in the original bill was that each state was to de-
termine by its own law how to elect or appoint its delegates. Absent 
an explicit constitutional requirement to the contrary, Congress 
should be free to require that the delegates be elected, thereby insur-
ing a democratic basis in the election of delegates. A natural system, 
it seems to me, would be the election of delegates on a district basis 
to correspond with the districts used in electing Representatives to the 
House of Representatives plus the election of two delegates at large 
to take care of the representation in the Senate. This is the system 
provided for in the amended bill.12 
The more important question, however, goes to the question of 
voting power. Senator Ervin's original proposal that each state would 
vote as a unit, as determined by a majority vote of its delegates, and 
that each state would have one vote followed the pattern of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 which furnishes the most direct 
precedent. It is obviously based on a theory of representation of the 
states. But nothing in the language of article V compels the conclu-
sion that a convention called under its authority must duplicate the 
1787 Convention. Alternatives may be suggested. One is the pattern 
of the electoral college system which, while resulting in a unit vote, 
gives each state a total vote equal to its representation in Congress.13 
The other-which would mark the widest departure from the state 
representation theory and clearly rests on the theory of a convention 
of the people-would ignore the unit rule altogether, give a vote to 
each delegate, and permit convention action by majority vote. This is 
the system provided for in Senator Ervin's amended bill. I am not 
prepared to say that any one of these systems is either commanded or 
prohibited by the article V text. Here the constitutional issue may be 
9. S. 2037, § 7(a) (original bill). 
10. Id. § 9(a) (original bill). 
11. S. 2037, §§ 9(a), IO(a) (amended bill). 
12. Id. § 7(a) (amended bill). 
13. This appears to be Senator Dirksen's idea of the voting basis as stated in an 
interview, Rewrite the U.S. Constitution?, reported in U.S. NEWS AND ·woRLD REPORT, 
June 5, 1967, at 63, 65. 
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separated from the policy issue. The language of article V in confid-
ing to Congress the duty to call a convention leaves Congress with 
discretion to determine what kind of convention it should be. Its 
choice rests then on policy considerations. It may be contended that 
Senator Ervin's original proposal was most faithful to the historical 
antecedents and in this sense gives effect to what the Framers had in 
mind when they envisioned a convention to be called by Congress in 
response to applications by the states. But it would strike me as most 
unfortunate to attempt to reproduce the basic theory of the 1787 
Convention. The Philadelphia Convention assumed the pattern it 
did because there were no other choices. Here were states getting 
together to form a union. But today, after 17 5 years of experience 
under the Constitution, we are a nation and not just a collection of 
states.14 It is fair and proper to say that historical experience has 
confirmed John Marshall's observation in McCulloch v. Maryland15 
that our Constitution derives its authority from the people. This 
conclusion is reinforced by an increased commitment, again a matter 
of historical development, to democratic principles and procedures. 
The question then is whether Congress in exercising its discretion 
under article V will be guided by historical precedent or by con-
temporary understanding of the basis and nature of our political 
society. The amended Ervin bill by substituting a majority vote of 
all delegates in place of the unit rule prescribed in his original bill 
achieves a radical change in the basic conception of the convention 
and thereby removes what was probably the most vulnerable feature 
of his original proposal. 
A further critical question is whether a convention called by 
Congress could be limited as to the subject matter of the amendments 
to be proposed by it. The Ervin bill rests on certain premises: that 
Congress must take account only of applications for a convention to 
deal with specific subject matters, that two-thirds of the states must 
within a four-year period join in applications respecting a given 
subject matter, that a convention called by Congress can then be 
limited to proposals dealing with these matters, and that Congress 
14. [W]e may add that when we are dealing with words that also are a con• 
stituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they 
have called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to 
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and 
has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a 
nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience 
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. 
Holmes, J., in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819). 
March 1968] Alternative Amendment Process 911 
will not be obligated to submit for ratification any proposals on 
unrelated matters.16 Various devices are employed to secure this 
result. 
The constitutional language is ambiguous on these questions. It 
says that Congress shall call a convention to propose amendments on 
application of two-thirds of the states. Obviously, this language admits 
of varying constructions. Probably the most extreme is that as soon 
as applications are filed with Congress from thirty-four different 
legislatures for a convention to propose amendments on various spe-
cific subject matters, Congress then is under a duty to call a conven-
tion which would be free to propose any amendments it saw fit to the 
Constitution. The narrowest construction, it seems to me, is that 
which is proposed in the Ervin bill, namely, that two-thirds of the 
states in their applications must unite within a limited period of time 
on a given subject matter for constitutional amendment proposals 
and that any convention called will be limited to that subject matter. 
In dealing with these questions I believe two basic ideas should 
be kept in mind. First of all, with respect to the requirement that 
the applications be by two-thirds of the states, it is fair to suppose that 
the drafters intended that there be a substantial consensus among 
the states. This consensus should extend to two matters, one relating 
to the time factor and the other to the subject factor. So far as the 
time factor is concerned it should be a requirement that for the appli-
cations of two-thirds of the states to be taken into account, all should 
be submitted within a restricted period of time so as to indicate a 
very substantial agreement on the part of the states at a given period 
of time in submitting their applications.17 Second, Congress should 
be free to require that the applications show a substantial consensus 
with respect to the purpose for which the convention is to be called. 
If twelve states apply to Congress to call a convention to propose 
amendments dealing with legislative reapportionment, another 
twelve apply for a convention to propose amendments on the ques-
tions of prayers in public schools, and ten other states apply for a con-
vention to propose popular election of the President, it is fair and 
16. See S. 2307, §§ 2, 5(a), 6, 8(a) lO(b), ll(b) (amended bill). 
17. This same general principle has been recognized by Congress in submitting 
proposals for constitutional amendment to the states for ratification. Beginning with 
the eighteenth amendment, Congress has followed the practice (except in the case of 
the nineteenth amendment) of stipulating that the amendment will be inoperative 
unless ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states within seven years from 
the date of its admission. The power of Congress in proposing an amendment to fix 
a reasonable period within which the amendment may be ratified was upheld in 
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
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proper for Congress to decide that the consensus of purpose implicit 
in the two-thirds requirement is lacking. 
But once it is determined that two-thirds of the states, within a 
limited period of time as specified by Congress, have joined in an 
application to Congress to call a convention dealing with certain 
specific matters, may Congress then limit the convention to proposals 
concerning these matters only? Certainly the language of the con-
stitution affords a basis for the argument that once a convention is 
called that convention will be free to propose any amendments which 
it sees fit to support and that Congress cannot limit its freedom. The 
language used in article V that Congress shall call a convention to 
propose "amendments" supports the idea of a free convention. This, 
however, is not an inescapable conclusion. Should Congress call, a 
convention, in effect it would be responding to applications of two-
thirds of the legislatures. If the requisite majority of legislatures is 
directed solely to the end of calling a convention to propose amend-
ment on a given subject matter, it is in keeping with the underlying 
purpose of the alternative amendment procedure for Congress to 
limit the convention to such proposals. The general purpose of the 
alternative amendment provision is to provide something of a safety 
valve in case the state legislatures are deeply troubled about a matter 
which Congress refuses to correct by invoking its own power to pro-
pose amendments. If the applications for a call to a constitutional 
convention evidence only one concern-illustratively, a proposal to 
deal with the basis of legislative apportionment-why should Con-
gress be required to call a convention with authority to propose any 
kind of an amendment? As long as the states have petitioned only 
for a limited convention, it should be within the competence of 
Congress to issue a call for such a limited convention. Indeed, the 
usefulness of the alternative amendment procedure as a means of 
dealing with a specific grievance on the part of the states will be de-
feated if the states are told that it can be invoked only at the price of 
subjecting the nation to all the problems, expense, and risks involved 
in having a wide open constitutional convention. 
The Ervin proposal, however, goes further. It is bottomed on the 
proposition that the alternative method of amending the Constitu-
tion can be initiated only by applications from state legislatures for a 
convention to propose one or more amendments and stating the 
nature of the amendment or amendments to be proposed.18 This, I 
18. S. 2307, § 2 (amended bill). 
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think, is a basic error in the Ervin proposal. Nothing in the language 
of article V indicates that states can be limited by Congress in the ap-
plications they make. Indeed, it seems to me that the most natural 
interpretation in the language of article V is that if two-thirds of the 
states request Congress to call a convention to propose amendments 
generally, Congress is under a duty to do so. A basic consideration 
supports this conclusion. Article V defines alternative but parallel 
procedures for proposing amendments to the Constitution. The one 
procedure requires a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress. In 
this sense Congress may be said to sit as a continuing constitutional 
convention. It is free to propose such amendments as it sees fit. But 
the Constitution also explicitly sanctions the convention procedure, 
upon application by the states, as an alternative to the process 
initiated by action of Congress. It should, therefore, be within the 
power of the states, if they so desire, to apply to Congress for a 
convention possessing the same freedom to propose amendments 
which Congress enjoys. 
Admittedly the resolution of the questions here discussed is 
fraught with difficulties and conjecture. The task alone of trying to 
define for purpose of limitation the subject matter of proposals to 
be considered by a convention is a formidable one. Opinions may 
well differ on the question whether Congress may limit the subject of 
amendments considered and proposed by a convention once it has 
been called. Is Congress under a duty to submit to the states for 
ratification amendments or revisions proposed by a convention which 
turns loose and disregards limitations imposed on it by Congress? 
Certainly Congress would be under strong pressure in that event to 
submit the convention's proposals to the states for ratification. What 
is least likely is that the Supreme Court would intervene and declare 
invalid amendments originating in a people's convention, submitted 
by the Congress, and ratified by the states. It is equally improbable 
that the Court would undertake to force Congress to submit pro-
posals which Congress determined to be beyond the scope of the 
convention's authority. In short, whatever may be the theoretical 
limitations on the power of Congress to exclude judicial review of 
these questions, the practical result may well be that the Court would 
elect to treat these as political questions and in effect give Congress 
the upper hand in resolution of the constitutional issues. 
The possibility that a convention might be called to consider and 
propose amendments to the Constitution has aroused fear and con-
sternation. Various considerations are advanced in opposition to the 
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alternative method of amendment: that it furnishes a means of 
minority control of the amendment process; of bypassing Congress 
and allowing parochial and state-centered interests to prevail; of 
upsetting Supreme Court decisions; and of opening an avenue for 
radical distortion of the system which has served us so well. Further, 
it is claimed there are no urgent needs or critical problems which 
justify the calling of a federal constitutional convention. 
On the issue of minority control Mr. Theodore Sorenson states 
that "thirty-four states representing 30% of the population could 
call the convention, twenty-six states representing one-sixth of the 
population could propose new amendments, and thirty-eight states 
representing less than 40% of the population could ratify them."19 
In comment on this statement it may be observed that Mr. Sorenson 
starts with the states having the smallest populations in building up 
the number requisite for the various steps required for the alter-
native amendment process and assumes a congruence of interest 
among them. This, in itself, is a speculative assumption. It is not 
irrelevant to observe that through use of this same method the 
Senators from each of the least populous seventeen states can pres-
ently obstruct a constitutional amendment which may be desired by 
a preponderant majority of both houses of Congress. 
The most dramatic aspect of Mr. Sorenson's statement, granting 
the validity of his assumption, is that twenty-six states representing 
one-sixth of the population could propose new amendments. Here 
he proceeds on the assumption, as he recognizes, that the convention 
called by Congress would be a convention of the states, acting 
through their representatives, and that each state would cast one vote 
on a unit rule basis. This was the rule embodied in Senator Ervin's 
original bilL But if Congress makes the convention a true delegate 
convention by giving a vote to each delegate and making the con-
vention's actions turn on a majority vote of all the delegates, as is 
provided in the amended Ervin bill, the central argument advanced 
by Mr_ Sorenson respecting minority domination loses its force. 
A further criticism is that the alternative amendment process 
permits a by-passing of Congress and allows parochial and state-
centered interests to prevaiL But this alternative procedure is another 
one of the compromises or accommodations that permeate our federal 
system. Congress has the power to initiate amendments and the states 
have the power one further step removed. Certainly the national 
19. The Quiet Campaign To Rewrite the Constitution, SAT. REv., July 15, 1967, 
at 17, 19. 
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legislature, with its national perspective and knowledgeability, should 
have an important voice in the amendment process. This is assured 
by the method which has been employed exclusively to this time. But 
the states too have interests in the federal system which Congress may 
not always recognize. The alternative amendment procedure fur-
nishes a vehicle for consideration of those interests. The very fact 
that Congress is concerned primarily with national interests con-
stitutes a reason for an amendment procedure which starts from a 
different perspective. The whole purpose of the alternative amend-
ment procedure is to give the states an opportunity to voice their 
concerns if the national government is thought to abuse its powers. 
As long as we continue to have a federal system, this is a legitimate 
consideration. 
It is also urged that a convention called by Congress upon appli-
cation by the states could be so state-minded and parochial in its 
vision as to submit proposals injurious to national concerns. There 
would be a substantial risk of this if the convention were a conven-
tion of the states and each state had an equal vote. This possibility 
makes it all the more important that the convention be a genuine 
delegate convention, representing the electorate and a variety of 
political, economic, and social interests. Such a convention might 
still be more sympathetic to state interests than the Congress, with 
its concern for national interest; indeed, as noted above, this was the 
reason underlying the alternative amendment procedure. But I have 
difficulty believing that a convention so constituted would emerge as 
a distinctive states' rights convention. Indeed, its deliberations and 
conclusions might even surprise the state legislatures which united 
in the application for a convention. 
The further objection is raised that in any event the time is not 
ripe for a constitutional convention. We face no acute constitutional 
problems of the kind that faced the representatives who gathered in 
Philadelphia in 1787. Our constitutional system has served us well 
to date; let us, therefore, leave well enough alone. A convention con-
sisting of delegates with various stripes of opinion could be a Pan-
dora's box and result in extreme proposals whether to the right or 
to the left. I am not much impressed by this parade of horribilities. 
We have had experience with a number of state constitutional con-
ventions, and nothing in this experience, including even the recent 
ill-fated New York Convention, suggests that a federal constitutional 
convention would be infected with the radicalism of either left or 
right. Indeed, the success on the whole of recent conventions in 
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drafting improved state constitutions affords a basis for considerable 
optimism. Moreover, any radical proposals stemming from a federal 
people's convention would have to run the gauntlet of ratification 
by three-fourths of the states, whether by the legislature or state 
convention, as Congress chooses to direct. 
Whether there is a need for general constitutional revision is a 
matter of subjective judgment. We may well agree, however, that 
there is no crying or critical need for a general constitutional con-
vention and that we can continue to get along reasonably well by 
using the ad hoc amending process, whether initiated by Congress 
or the states. In any event the question whether the time is ripe 
for a general constitutional convention is really beside the point, 
unless any convention which is called is necessarily a free conven-
tion. In this connection, it should be recognized and emphasized 
that the applications to Congress by the state legislature have not 
been directed to the end of calling a convention with an unlimited 
power to propose amendments. On the contrary, the legislatures 
have been interested in the calling of a convention to propose 
amendments on specific subject matters, such as the basis for state 
legislative apportionment. This is a legitimate state concern, and 
whether the concern is sufficient to warrant the application for a 
convention to make proposals directed to this issue is for the state 
legislatures to decide. There is no evidence of any substantial in-
terest in the calling of a general constitutional convention. State 
legislatures may well feel that the states have as much to lose as 
they have to gain by the calling of a convention free to propose 
any amendment or amendments it sees fit. If it may be assumed 
that Congress in making its response to applications submitted by 
the states can limit the convention to proposals dealing with the 
specific matter or matters identified in the applications, determined 
according to rules prescribed by Congress, the question whether the 
time is ripe for a general constitutional convention is likely to re-
main academic. 
Any consideration of the alternative amendment procedure and 
of the Ervin bill as a concrete proposal for implementing this proce-
dure invites some thought as to the whole process of constitutional 
change. The Constitution recognizes two procedures for formal 
amendment of the Constitution. Both of these procedures are hedged 
in by limitations designed to prevent easy change by a transitory 
majority. This is as it should be. The Constitution was designed 
as a relatively permanent document. The accumulated wisdom of 
March 1968] Alternative Amendment Process 917 
past generations should not be lightly discarded or modified. But 
it is easy to overemphasize the permanence of the written Consti-
tution. The truth is that we have had remarkable constitutional 
development in our country with an accommodation of the system 
to vast changes in our national life. The process of constitutional 
change in adaptation to new needs and conditions, however, has 
come about only in part through the formal amendment process. 
This fact is obscured in the popular understanding of the Consti-
tution by a mythology which attaches a peculiar sanctity to the text 
of the Constitution and presumes that this text, aided by well-de-
fined techniques of legal interpretation, yields compelling answers 
in determining the relevance of the text to today's problems. 
The role of the Supreme Court is a part of this mythology. Ac-
cording to the myth the Court does no more than apply the Con-
stitution to the cases before it. If the Supreme Court holds that the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires ap-
portionment of both houses of the legislature on the basis of the 
"one man-one vote" rule, this must be a necessary deduction from the 
text of the Constitution. Central to this mythology is a refusal or 
failure to recognize that by its decisions the Supreme Court deter-
mines what the Constitution means and that in the interpretation 
of the broad and indeterminate provisions of the Constitution the 
Court is free to disregard history and precedent and interpret on 
the basis of its own policy predilections and its sense of the basic 
values of contemporary society. Judicial interpretation is the ve-
hicle for the assertion of judicial will. 
This informal process of amendment by judicial interpretation 
has perhaps been more significant over the long run than the formal 
processes of amendment. The whole process whereby the first amend-
ment is now for all practical purposes made to read, "Neither Con-
gress nor the states shall pass any laws respecting an establishment 
of religion . . ." is only one conspicuous illustration of a basic 
alteration in the federal system by judicial interpretation. In recent 
overruling decisions the Supreme Court has recognized the creative 
elements in the constitutional interpretation process by holding that 
certain decisions fashioning new constitutional law should be ap-
plied prospectively only.20 The Court has said that its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.21 When 
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. United States 
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
21. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1958). 
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the Court changes its interpretation, it changes the law of the land. 
When formal processes are used to make these changes, we speak 
of an amendment to the Constitution. The informal amending pro-
cess is called judicial interpretation. 
I am not suggesting that this kind of judicial power is bad or 
that decisions of the Court, viewed as policy judgments by a tri-
bunal which employs the forms of law in dealing with important 
political and social problems, are bad. I am suggesting only that 
we recognize realistically the creative role the Court has assumed 
in maintaining the validity of the Constitution as a living docu-
ment responsive to what the Court regards as the dominant values 
of our contemporary society and that we acknowledge that the Court 
is free to and does use the Constitution as an instrument for achiev-
ing what it regards as desirable changes in the political and social 
order.22 
Such a realistic appraisal of the Court's role should help to keep 
in proper perspective the questions relating to the amendment pro-
cess and particularly the questions which arise when proposals are 
made for amendments designed to overcome or avoid the effects of 
Supreme Court decisions which result in constitutional changes. It 
is one thing to oppose any such proposals on the merits. But the 
issue should not be confused with cries that we are tampering with 
the Constitution or summarily dismissed with the observation that 
the decision may be ·wrong or the Court may have abused its power 
but we should not amend the Constitution to correct the error. 
The issue cuts more deeply than this. The question is where lies 
the ultimate authority to fashion new constitutional policy? Some, 
distrustful of the people and quite happy with rules by the elite, 
may be quite content to have basic constitutional policy determined 
by what Professor Burgess described as "the aristocracy of the robe"23 
or by what the late Judge Learned Hand referred to as "a bevy of 
Platonic Guardians."24 Our Constitution is premised on the assump-
tion, however, that the powers of government derive from consent 
of the governed and that the people have the ultimate authority 
over the decisions that touch their important concerns. The Court's 
22. For protests against what they regard as the Court's use of its power of 
judicial review as a substitute for the formal amendment process, see the dissenting 
opinions of Justice Harlan in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964), and in 
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966), and of Justice Black 
in the Harper case, id. at 677-78 and in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522-27 
(1965). 
23. 2 J. BURGESS, POLITICAL ScmNCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 365 (1891). 
24. L. HAND, THE BILI. OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). 
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policy formulations and value predilections are, therefore, properly 
subject to scrutiny before the bar of public opinion. Its use of the 
Constitution as an instrument of social change is subject to review 
and criticism by the ultimate authority in constitutional matters. 
The Court's decisions may strike a responsive note. If they do not, 
various corrective processes may be available. The amendment pro-
cess is one of these. The amendment procedures are hedged in with 
enough restrictions to prevent a hasty and intemperate overruling 
of judicial decisions. Indeed, in the face of the enormous advan-
tages enjoyed by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its powers, 
the power reserved to the people to express their will and judg-
ment by means of the carefully limited amendment process, whether 
initiated by the representatives in Congress or in the state legisla-
tures, seems modest enough. 
CONCLUSION 
It is highly important that Congress define procedures and rules 
to govern the alternative mode of constitutional amendment. Con-
gress owes it to the states to put them on notice respecting what 
will be required and to formulate general legislation on the sub-
ject rather than rely on ad hoc improvisations representing a hasty 
response to a concrete situation. Its duty is both to fashion an ap-
propriate body of rules to govern the matter and to respond in ac-
cordance with these rules when applications are filed with it by 
two-thirds of the states. 
To repeat what I said at the outset, Senator Ervin is to be com-
mended for taking the initiative in this matter by introducing his 
bill and thereby stimulating debate on the kind of enabling legis-
lation needed and the basic features it should incorporate. Admit-
tedly this is a wide open field since there are no authoritative inter-
pretations or legislative precedents to give guidance. Any conclu-
sions expressed either on the constitutional aspects of the Ervin 
bill or on its merits are matters of individual opinion buttressed 
at most by an understanding, whether correct or incorrect, of the 
general purpose intended by the alternative amendment clause of 
article V. 
The Ervin bill incorporates a number of good provisions. Some 
of its very vital and fundamental features, however, are highly de-
batable. It is by no means clear that Congress can limit the author-
ity of a convention to make proposals, once a convention is called. 
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But probably the most crucial issue is whether a convention called 
pursuant to article V will be regarded as a convention of the states' 
representatives, as provided in Senator Ervin's original bill, or a 
convention of the people's delegates, as recognized in his amended 
bill. Many other issues turn on the resolution of this central ques-
tion. The opportunity for judicial resolutions of the constitutional 
issues will be highly limited and, indeed, the Court may elect to 
abstain from deciding what it regards as political questions. In ef-
fect, then, Congress by its implementing legislation and the deter-
minations pursuant to it will be resolving both the constitutional 
and policy questions. This is added reason why the whole range of 
questions opened up by Senator Ervin's proposal deserves wide de-
bate and discussion. 
